Fundamental Flaws In The IFF Report On D.C. Schools

A new report, commissioned by the District of Columbia Mayor Vincent Gray and conducted by the Chicago-based consulting organization IFF, was supposed to provide guidance on how the District might act and invest strategically in school improvement, including optimizing the distribution of students across schools, many of which are either over- or under-enrolled.

Needless to say, this is a monumental task. Not only does it entail the identification of high- and low-performing schools, but plans for improving them as well. Even the most rigorous efforts to achieve these goals, especially in a large city like D.C., would be to some degree speculative and error-prone.

This is not a rigorous effort. IFF’s final report is polished and attractive, with lovely maps and color-coded tables presenting a lot of summary statistics. But there’s no emperor underneath those clothes. The report's data and analysis are so deeply flawed that its (rather non-specific) recommendations should not be taken seriously.

The Perilous Conflation Of Student And School Performance

Unlike many of my colleagues and friends, I personally support the use of standardized testing results in education policy, even, with caution and in a limited role, in high-stakes decisions. That said, I also think that the focus on test scores has gone way too far and their use is being implemented unwisely, in many cases to a degree at which I believe the policies will not only fail to generate improvement, but may even risk harm.

In addition, of course, tests have a very productive low-stakes role to play on the ground – for example, when teachers and administrators use the results for diagnosis and to inform instruction.

Frankly, I would be a lot more comfortable with the role of testing data – whether in policy, on the ground, or in our public discourse – but for the relentless flow of misinterpretation from both supporters and opponents. In my experience (which I acknowledge may not be representative of reality), by far the most common mistake is the conflation of student and school performance, as measured by testing results.

Consider the following three stylized arguments, which you can hear in some form almost every week:

Schools' Effectiveness Varies By What They Do, Not What They Are

There may be a mini-trend emerging in certain types of charter school analyses, one that seems a bit trivial but has interesting implications that bear on the debate about charter schools in general. It pertains to how charter effects are presented.

Usually, when researchers estimate the effect of some intervention, the main finding is the overall impact, perhaps accompanied by a breakdown by subgroups and supplemental analyses. In the case of charter schools, this would be the estimated overall difference in performance (usually testing gains) between students attending charters versus their counterparts in comparable regular public schools.

Two relatively recent charter school reports, however – both generally well-done given their scope and available data – have taken a somewhat different approach, at least in the “public roll-out” of their results.

Income And Educational Outcomes

The role of poverty in shaping educational outcomes is one of the most common debates going on today. It can also be one of the most shallow.

The debate tends to focus on income. For example (and I’m generalizing a bit here), one “side” argues that income and test scores are strongly correlated; the other “side” points to the fact that many low-income students do very well and cautions against making excuses for schools’ failure to help poor kids.

Both arguments have merit, but it bears quickly mentioning that the focus on the relationship between income and achievement is a rather crude conceptualization of the importance of family background (and non-schooling factors in general) for education outcomes. Income is probably among the best widely available proxies for these factors, insofar as it is correlated with many of the conditions that can hinder learning, especially during a child’s earliest years. This includes (but is not at all limited to): peer effects; parental education; access to print and background knowledge; parental involvement; family stressors; access to healthcare; and, of course, the quality of neighborhood schools and their teachers.

And that is why, when researchers try to examine school performance – while holding constant the effect of factors outside of schools’ control – income or some kind of income-based proxy (usually free/reduced price lunch) can be a useful variable. It is, however, quite limited.

Trial And Error Is Fine, So Long As You Know The Difference

It’s fair to say that improved teacher evaluation is the cornerstone of most current education reform efforts. Although very few people have disagreed on the need to design and implement new evaluation systems, there has been a great deal of disagreement over how best to do so – specifically with regard to the incorporation of test-based measures of teacher productivity (i.e., value-added and other growth model estimates).

The use of these measures has become a polarizing issue. Opponents tend to adamantly object to any degree of incorporation, while many proponents do not consider new evaluations meaningful unless they include test-based measures as a major element (say, at least 40-50 percent). Despite the air of certainty on both sides, this debate has mostly been proceeding based on speculation. The new evaluations are just getting up and running, and there is virtually no evidence as to their effects under actual high-stakes implementation.

For my part, I’ve said many times that I'm receptive to trying value-added as a component in evaluations (see here and here), though I disagree strongly with the details of how it’s being done in most places. But there’s nothing necessarily wrong with divergent opinions over an untested policy intervention, or with trying one. There is, however, something wrong with fully implementing such a policy without adequate field testing, or at least ensuring that the costs and effects will be carefully evaluated post-implementation. To date, virtually no states/districts of which I'm aware have mandated large-scale, independent evaluations of their new systems.*

If this is indeed the case, the breathless, speculative debate happening now will only continue in perpetuity.

New Report: Does Money Matter?

Over the past few years, due to massive budget deficits, governors, legislators and other elected officials are having to slash education spending. As a result, incredibly, there are at least 30 states in which state funding for 2011 is actually lower than in 2008. In some cases, including California, the amounts are over 20 percent lower.

Only the tiniest slice of Americans believe that we should spend less on education, while a large majority actually supports increased funding. At the same time, however, there’s a concerted effort among some advocates, elected officials and others to convince the public that spending more money on education will not improve outcomes, while huge cuts need not do any harm.

Often, their evidence comes down to some form of the following graph:

Do Half Of New Teachers Leave The Profession Within Five Years?

You’ll often hear the argument that half or almost half of all beginning U.S. public school teachers leave the profession within five years.

The implications of this statistic are, of course, that we are losing a huge proportion of our new teachers, creating a “revolving door” of sorts, with teachers constantly leaving the profession and having to be replaced. This is costly, both financially (it is expensive to recruit and train new teachers) and in terms of productivity (we are losing teachers before they reach their peak effectiveness). And this doesn’t even include teachers who stay in the profession but switch schools and/or districts (i.e., teacher mobility).*

Needless to say, some attrition is inevitable, and not all of it is necessarily harmful, Many new teachers, like all workers, leave (or are dismissed) because they are just aren’t good at it – and, indeed, there is test-based evidence that novice leavers are, on average, less effective. But there are many other excellent teachers who exit due to working conditions or other negative factors that might be improved (for reviews of the literature on attrition/retention, see here and here).

So, the “almost half of new teachers leave within five years” statistic might serve as a useful diagnosis of the extent of the problem. As is so often the case, however, it's rarely accompanied by a citation. Let’s quickly see where it comes from, how it might be interpreted, and, finally, take a look at some other relevant evidence.

New Policy Brief: The Evidence On Charter Schools And Test Scores

In case you missed it, today we released a new policy brief, which provides an accessible review of the research on charter schools’ testing effects, how their varying impacts might be explained, and what this evidence suggests about the ongoing proliferation of these schools.

The brief is an adaptation of a three-part series of posts on this blog (here is part one, part two and part three).

Download the policy brief (PDF)

The abstract is pasted directly below.

The Deafening Silence Of Unstated Assumptions

Here’s a thought experiment. Let’s say we were magically granted the ability to perfectly design our public education system. In other words, we were somehow given the knowledge of the most effective policies and how to implement them, and we put everything in place. How quickly would schools improve? Where would we be after 20 years of having the best possible policies in place? What about after 50 years?

I suspect there is much disagreement here, and that answers would vary widely. But, since there is a tendency in education policy to shy away from even talking realistically about expectations, we may never really know. We sometimes operate as though we expect immediate gratification - quick gains, every single year. When schools or districts don't achieve gains, even over a short period of time, they are subject to being labeled as failures.

Without question, we need to set and maintain high expectations, and no school or district should ever cease trying to improve. Yet, in the context of serious policy discussions, the failure to even discuss expectations in a realistic manner hinders our ability to interpret and talk about evidence, as it often means that we have no productive standard by which to judge our progress or the effects of the policies we try.

Do Teachers Really Come From The "Bottom Third" Of College Graduates?

** Also posted here on 'Valerie Strauss' Answer Sheet' in the Washington Post

The conventional wisdom among many education commentators is that U.S. public school teachers “come from the bottom third” of their classes. Most recently, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg took this talking point a step further, and asserted at a press conference last week that teachers are drawn from the bottom 20 percent of graduates.

All of this is supposed to imply that the U.S. has a serious problem with the “quality” of applicants to the profession.

Despite the ubiquity of the “bottom third” and similar arguments (which are sometimes phrased as massive generalizations, with no reference to actual proportions), it’s unclear how many of those who offer them know what specifically they refer to (e.g., GPA, SAT/ACT, college rank, etc.). This is especially important since so many of these measurable characteristics are not associated with future test-based effectiveness in the classroom, while those that are are only modestly so.

Still, given how often it is used, as well as the fact that it is always useful to understand and examine the characteristics of the teacher labor supply, it’s worth taking a quick look at where the “bottom third” claim comes from and what it might or might not mean.